Coordinated vulnerability disclosure under the CRA: policy, intake and security.txt
The Cyber Resilience Act makes coordinated vulnerability disclosure a legal requirement: manufacturers must put in place and enforce a policy for receiving and handling vulnerability reports from third parties, provide a contact address, and publicly disclose fixed vulnerabilities. ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111 describe how; RFC 9116 security.txt publishes the contact.
By the Vellaci teamPublished Updated 6 min readOperational guidance, not legal advice
Key facts
- Legal basis
- Annex I Part II(4)–(6); Art. 13(6) for upstream components
- Standards
- ISO/IEC 29147 (disclosure), ISO/IEC 30111 (handling), RFC 9116 (security.txt)
- Must include
- Intake channel, scope, safe harbour, acknowledgement and handling timelines, disclosure approach, credit
- Connects to
- Article 14 — a report may be the awareness moment for an exploited vulnerability
What the CRA requires
Annex I Part II(5) requires manufacturers to put in place and enforce a policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure; Part II(6) requires them to take measures to facilitate the sharing of information about potential vulnerabilities, including by providing a contact address; Part II(4) requires public disclosure of information about fixed vulnerabilities once a security update is available, including a description, affected products, impacts, severity and remediation guidance. Article 13(6) adds the upstream direction: when a manufacturer identifies a vulnerability in a component, including open source, it reports it to the component's maintainer and, where it fixes it, shares the fix. Recital and guidance also recognise the role of CSIRTs as intermediaries where a reporter and manufacturer cannot coordinate directly.
What a defensible policy contains
- Scope: which products, versions and services are covered; what is out of scope (third-party services, social engineering, denial of service).
- How to report: an e-mail address and/or web form, PGP key, what to include, preferred languages.
- Safe harbour: a commitment not to pursue good-faith research that respects the scope, and what 'good faith' means.
- Timelines: acknowledgement (two business days is common), triage (five business days), fix targets by severity, and a default public-disclosure window (90 days is the most widely cited reference point) with the conditions for extension.
- Coordination: how you communicate progress, whether you support CVE assignment, how you coordinate with downstream manufacturers and CSIRTs.
- Credit: how researchers are acknowledged, and an opt-out.
- Ownership: who inside the company owns the process, and how reports become tickets, findings and — where exploitation is evidenced — Article 14 cases.
Publishing the contact: security.txt
RFC 9116 defines a machine-readable file at /.well-known/security.txt with at least Contact and Expires fields, and optionally Policy, Preferred-Languages, Acknowledgments, Canonical and Encryption. It is the first thing researchers and scanners look for. Generate one with the free tool on this site, publish it on every domain that hosts a product or its documentation, keep the expiry under a year and sign it if you can.
Running intake
A policy is only as good as the mailbox behind it. Route reports to a shared queue with an on-call owner, acknowledge within the promised time, record the report as a finding linked to the affected products and versions, and evaluate two questions immediately: severity, and whether the report contains evidence of exploitation in the wild. The second question matters because a researcher's report can be the awareness moment for Article 14 — record the time you received it and the time you confirmed the evidence.
Disclosure of fixed vulnerabilities
Once a security update is available, publish an advisory: identifier (CVE where assigned), affected products and versions, severity (CVSS), impact, fixed versions, workarounds, and credit. Where publication would harm security more than it helps — for example while exploitation is ongoing and the update is still rolling out — the CRA allows delaying publication; document the reasoning. Machine-readable formats (CSAF, CycloneDX VEX) let customers consume advisories automatically.
A policy outline you can adopt today
| Section | What to write |
|---|---|
| 1. Purpose and scope | Which products, versions, domains and services; what is excluded |
| 2. How to report | E-mail and form, PGP key, what to include (product, version, steps, impact), languages |
| 3. Our commitments | Acknowledge in 2 business days; triage in 5; keep you informed at least every 30 days; fix targets by severity |
| 4. Your commitments (safe harbour) | Good-faith research, no data exfiltration beyond proof, no denial of service, no social engineering, reasonable time to fix |
| 5. Disclosure | Default 90-day coordinated window; earlier if fixed; extensions by agreement; how CVEs are assigned |
| 6. Recognition | Hall of fame and, where offered, rewards; opt-out |
| 7. Third-party components | How we handle reports about components we integrate, and how we pass them upstream |
| 8. Contact and version | security.txt link, policy version and date |
Disclosure timelines: common industry reference points
The CRA does not set a disclosure deadline. Annex I Part II(4) requires manufacturers to disclose fixed vulnerabilities once a security update is available and lets them delay publication in duly justified cases until users have had the possibility to apply the patch. How long a researcher waits before publishing is therefore a matter of the policy you agree with reporters — and researchers will compare yours with the programmes they know.
The reference points below come from the publishers' own policies as of the review date of this guide. They are deadlines that well-known research and coordination programmes apply to vendors, not legal requirements; use them to calibrate a default window you can actually meet, and state how you handle actively exploited vulnerabilities, which every programme treats faster.
| Programme | Default window | Shorter or special cases |
|---|---|---|
| Google Project Zero | 90 days from notification to make a patch available; technical details published 30 days after the patch, or at day 90 if no patch ships ('90+30') | 7 days when there is evidence of exploitation in the wild; a 14-day grace period may be granted on request (3 days for in-the-wild cases) |
| Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) | 120 days (four months) after the vendor is notified and responds | Shorter windows (30, 60 or 90 days) for incomplete or faulty patches depending on severity; an advisory after 15 business days if the vendor cannot be reached |
| The CRA (Annex I Part II(4)) | No fixed window: disclose once a security update is available | Publication may be delayed in duly justified cases until users can apply the patch; actively exploited vulnerabilities also trigger Article 14 reporting within 24 hours |
Aligning with ISO/IEC 29147 and 30111
29147 covers the external interface — receiving, coordinating and disclosing; 30111 covers the internal handling — triage, investigation, remediation and release. Together they map cleanly onto Annex I Part II and are the most likely basis for harmonised standards on vulnerability handling. If you already follow them, the CRA policy is largely a matter of writing down what you do and adding the Article 14 hand-off.
Frequently asked questions
- Do we have to run a bug bounty?
- No. A bounty is one way to encourage reports; the requirement is a working coordinated disclosure process with a published contact. Many manufacturers start with a clear policy and acknowledgements, and add rewards later.
- What if a researcher threatens to publish before the fix?
- Your policy's disclosure window and coordination commitments are your framework; a CSIRT can mediate. Document the communications — they are evidence of good-faith handling either way.
- Can the policy be one page?
- Yes, if it covers scope, channel, safe harbour, timelines, disclosure approach and credit. Clarity beats length; Vellaci generates a policy from an editable template with those sections and tracks the security.txt status per domain.
- How long should a coordinated disclosure window be?
- There is no legal number. Ninety days is the most widely cited reference point (Google Project Zero), 120 days is used by ZDI, and every major programme shortens the window when a vulnerability is exploited in the wild. Pick a default you can meet for your release cadence, publish it, and document every extension you agree.
- Is responsible disclosure the same as coordinated vulnerability disclosure?
- In everyday use, largely. 'Coordinated vulnerability disclosure' is the term used by the CRA, ISO/IEC 29147 and CSIRTs because it stresses coordination between reporter, manufacturer and, where needed, a CSIRT rather than who is being 'responsible'. A responsible-disclosure page that sets scope, contact, safe harbour and timelines meets the same need.
From requirement to evidence
What the obligations in this guide mean for an engineering, security or compliance team, the Vellaci workflow that supports each one, and the records it leaves. The full map for every CRA obligation is on the CRA compliance software page.
How to read this. Official requirement summarises the text of Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 with its reference. What your team does is Vellaci’s operational interpretation, not legal advice. Vellaci workflow and Evidence describe what the product does today. Methodology · reviewed 2026-10-05.
Coordinated vulnerability disclosure and contact address
Annex I, Part II(5)–(6)Applies from 11 Dec 2027- Official requirement
- Put in place and enforce a policy on coordinated vulnerability disclosure, and facilitate the sharing of information about potential vulnerabilities, including by providing a contact address for reporting them.
- What your team does (interpretation)
- Publish a reachable intake channel (for example security.txt), a disclosure policy with response targets, and keep a record of reports received and how they were handled.
- Vellaci workflow
- CVD settings per organisation: vulnerability contact, reporting URL, security.txt status, published policy URL, intake instructions and acknowledge / triage / fix targets; policy template aligned with ISO/IEC 29147. How it works
- Evidence produced
- Recorded contact point, security.txt and policy URL
- Response targets (acknowledge, triage, fix)
- Changes to the settings in the audit log
- Official requirement
- Once a security update has been made available, share and publicly disclose information about fixed vulnerabilities, including a description, the affected products, impact, severity and information helping users remediate; publication may be delayed in duly justified cases.
- What your team does (interpretation)
- Tie each advisory to the finding and the fix release, and record when and where it was published — or why publication was delayed.
- Vellaci workflow
- Fixed versions recorded on findings; CycloneDX VEX export for customers and downstream integrators. How it works
- Evidence produced
- Fixed version linked to the finding
- Exported VEX document
- Publication or delay rationale